

IFP GENDER CLUSTER

TURNING POLICY INTO IMPACT ON THE GROUND

Strengthening the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security by the European Union through the development of indicators and monitoring mechanisms

Synthesis report

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TURNING POLICY INTO IMPACT
ON THE GROUND

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ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CA	EU Comprehensive Approach for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 <i>on Women, Peace and Security</i>
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CSMO	Civil Society Monitoring Observatory
CSOs	Civil society organisations
CSPs	Country strategy papers
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
EC	European Commission
ECHO	EC Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
GAPS	Gender Action for Peace and Security
GBV	Gender-based violence
GMC	Global Monitoring Checklist
IfP	Initiative for Peacebuilding
LNAP	Liberia National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security
NAP	National Action Plan
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
OSAGI	UN Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women
UNIFEM	UN Development Fund for Women
SCR 1325	Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
SCR 1820	Security Council Resolution 1820 on Sexual Violence in Conflict
SMART	Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound [indicators]
SSR	Security sector reform
VAW	Violence against women
WG 1325	Dutch Working Group on 1325

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the adoption of the *EU Comprehensive Approach for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security (CA)*, the EU has a more coherent policy framework to guide its actions on gender and peacebuilding issues. Whilst this and other commitments signify important progress, gaps in implementation remain and it will be difficult to assess the impact of recent policy developments without effective monitoring mechanisms and clear lines of accountability. Building on the findings of the first phase of activities carried out in the framework of the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP), this gender cluster synthesis paper aims to provide guidance to the EU for the development of monitoring mechanisms in the field of gender and peacebuilding. The paper will also suggest concrete indicators for monitoring the CA and will discuss the link between monitoring, reporting and accountability.

MONITORING AND INDICATORS

Monitoring is an important way to validate policies and programmes and to increase accountability for their effective implementation. Gender-sensitive monitoring mechanisms are needed because they allow us to understand the impact of existing policies and ensure that they are not reinforcing existing gender inequalities. The development and use of concrete indicators will help to develop a shared understanding of what change in gender relations and more gender-sensitive programming and practice would look like.

Whilst there has been a significant body of work around gender indicators as applied to development interventions, there has been relatively little attention paid to the elaboration of indicators to capture the range of issues relevant to peacebuilding initiatives. The development of adequate indicators for conflict-affected societies is particularly difficult, as there are often substantial difficulties in collecting credible data and statistics. On the other hand, conventional statistics and quantitative indicators may not be sufficient in capturing important changes that are inherently linked to power relations and social dynamics, and as such are very difficult to measure. Civil society organisations (CSOs) can play an important role in monitoring peacebuilding processes from a gender perspective, and can use the evidence generated to demonstrate gaps in implementation, as well as to strengthen their own advocacy messages.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING MECHANISMS

There has been very little official monitoring of UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 by UN bodies, including the Security Council. Similarly, most of the National Action Plans (NAPs) that have been developed by UN member states, many of whom are also members of the EU, fail to incorporate any concrete or explicit provisions for monitoring or reporting or detailed information about who is accountable for implementation. It is important that data and other findings and lessons learned are gathered and fed back into the policy cycle, and that there are clear lines of responsibility for implementation if positive change is to be brought about. There are therefore important institutional mechanisms that need to be in place to ensure that monitoring efforts are regularly reported on, that the evidence gathered is analysed and evaluated, and that accountability structures are in place to ensure commitments are adhered to. Reporting on SCR 1325 and SCR 1820 on Sexual Violence in Conflict should therefore become a systematic feature of the EU's various reporting mechanisms, and the fact that this has now been committed to in the new CA is a sign of positive progress. Additionally, the new EU Task Force on Women, Peace and Security will be a useful mechanism to ensure accountability for progress on this agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of the first phase of IfP suggest that the EU could strengthen the impact of its peacebuilding initiatives through explicit and effective gender-sensitive monitoring mechanisms. EU institutions should consider the following recommendations in particular:

- The Task Force should take the lead on monitoring the work of different institutions in relation to the CA with clear terms of reference. The first task of this group could be to undertake a participatory process to develop a minimum set of process-related indicators for the CA;
- The EC should undertake an audit of its Programming Finances as well as existing human resource capacity to ensure that adequate resources exist to implement the commitments spelt out in the CA and to act as a baseline against which to assess future resource allocations;
- Key indicators on SCR 1325 and 1820 related issues should be included in standard EU reporting formats;
- The European Commission (EC) should develop concrete guidelines and check lists that build on the framework set out by the CA to allow for the development of more detailed activity and impact-related indicators;
- The EU should carry out an evaluation of the impact of SCR 1325-related activities to date and include a strong gender perspective in forthcoming thematic evaluations on EU support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and
- The EU and its Member States should support the development of NAPs in third countries and other regional bodies by providing technical capacity and financial resources, as well as through political and diplomatic pressure.

Keywords: Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, monitoring, indicators, accountability, gender and peacebuilding, EU

INTRODUCTION

A gender perspective, encompassing both women and men, should inform EU external actions in order to achieve a comprehensive response to the threats faced by the civilian population in times of conflict and in its aftermath. This is the premise for effective stabilisation, peace building, post-conflict reconstruction and institution building. Moreover, a strengthened commitment to gender issues in the EU activities, with regard to conflict prevention, crisis management, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and institution building, can enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore women's peace initiatives and conflict resolution efforts are a valuable resource for the development of sustainable and inclusive approaches to peace and security.¹

With the adoption by the Council of the EU on 8th December 2008 of the CA, the EU now has a more coherent policy framework to guide its actions on gender and peacebuilding issues. In addition, in December the Council adopted conclusions on a review of the implementation by Member States and the EU institutions of the Beijing Platform for Action, conducted during the French Presidency from July to December 2008. Amongst other issues, these conclusions stressed that Member States and the EC should develop and improve the indicators and data available on women and armed conflict, and that the specific needs of women and girls should be addressed in all aspects of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.² The French Presidency also prepared a report outlining four possible indicators for violence against women, relating to compliance with commitments concerning women and armed conflict.³ Whilst these documents signify important progress, gaps in implementation remain and it will be difficult to assess the impact of these new policy commitments without clear and accountable monitoring mechanisms. A coordinated effort is needed to develop clearer indicators to measure the integration of a gender perspective in EC peacebuilding policy, and monitoring mechanisms to assess progress and ensure accountability within the EU institutions.

Building on the findings of the first phase of activities carried out in the framework of IfP, this gender cluster synthesis paper aims to provide guidance to the EU around the need for and development of monitoring mechanisms and indicators for issues related to gender and peacebuilding, as well as the link between monitoring and reporting and accountability. It concludes with some recommendations for steps forward in turning the commitments outlined in the CA into concrete progress on the ground.

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- 1 Council of the EU (2008a). *Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security*. Brussels, Belgium: The Council of the EU. p .4, para.4.
 - 2 Council of the EU (2008b). *Council Conclusions on the review of the implementation by the Member States and the EU institutions of the Beijing Platform for Action*. Brussels, Belgium. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/lsa/104821.pdf.
 - 3 Council of the EU (2008c). *Review of the implementation by the Member States and the EU institutions of the Beijing Platform for Action – Indicators concerning Women and Armed Conflicts. Draft Council Conclusions*. Addendum 2 to the Note. Brussels, Belgium: EU. Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16596-ad02.en08.pdf>.

EU COMMITMENTS RELATING TO WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000, the EU has adopted a number of resolutions, instruments and policy documents that are either related to or mention women, peace and security issues.⁴ There are several guidelines, in particular the *Check list to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of ESDP Operations*.⁵ What has been lacking is a holistic and comprehensive approach across the EU's institutions that outlines a clear commitment and strategy to implement SCR 1325 and 1820. In response to this need, from the beginning of 2008 onwards, the EU Member States and its institutions have focused increasing attention on SCR 1325 and, since June 2008, on SCR 1820 on sexual violence and conflict.

In early 2008, the Slovenian Presidency of the EU Council commissioned a study to highlight the EU's strengths and weaknesses in relation to women and armed conflict. This report made a number of key recommendations relating to how the EU could deepen its understanding and integration of women and armed conflict issues into its work; the need for strategic policies or frameworks such as action plans to guide the EU's work relating to SCR 1325; and the structural obstacles that need to be addressed for implementation to be effective. The report also identified 10 potential short-term next steps that could be undertaken in the months following the publication of the report in April 2008.⁶ As well as recommending the establishment of a cross-institutional working group and the development of an SCR 1325 Action Plan (both of which have to some extent since been taken up), the report also suggested that the EU undertake further work on indicators.⁷

The French Presidency of the EU (July–December 2008), building on the Slovenian initiative, took on violence against women (VAW) as one of its presidential priorities. As part of this priority and in follow-up to the EU's commitment to ensure implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action,⁸ the Presidency conducted a review of Member State action related to the recommendations made under Platform E on women and armed conflict of the Beijing Platform.⁹ This review points to the uneven implementation across states, and the lack of clear information, evaluation or strategic prioritisation of the issue, despite some individual examples of good practice. This review and the Member State responses to the questionnaire distributed by the French Presidency could constitute an informal baseline against which to determine whether or not progress in implementation in the case of the individual Member States has been made.

In addition to this evaluation, the French Presidency produced a report outlining four indicators on VAW, based on the need to assess implementation of Platform E, which are listed in the box below. At the same time as acknowledging their limitation and the intention that they are just a starting point, the report suggests that the indicators could have a favourable impact on the procedures for information collection and sharing of good practices across different regions.

4 For a list of relevant resources, see: <http://www.eplo.org>.

5 Council of the EU (2006). *Check list to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of ESDP operations*. Note from Secretariat of the Council of the EU to Delegations, 27th July 2006. Brussels, Belgium. Available at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/hrji/docs/Check_list_to_ensure_gender_mainstreaming_12068_06en.pdf.

6 A. Sheriff with K. Barnes (2008). *Enhancing the EU response to women and armed conflict, with particular reference to development policy*. Study for the Slovenian Presidency of the EU. Maastricht, the Netherlands and Brussels, Belgium: European Centre for Development Policy Management.

7 It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline all the relevant EU policy documents relevant to UNSCR 1325. For a full list of the 10 next steps, please see: *Ibid.* p.82-84.

8 The Madrid European Council of 1995 called for an annual review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action by EU Member States and institutions. In 1998, the Council decided that this review should be accompanied by the development of quantitative and qualitative indicators. The method by which to establish the indicators was to issue a questionnaire to Member States and the EC, and draw from the recommendations and priorities of those bodies a set of indicators to assess implementation of Platform E.

9 Council of the EU (2008c). *Op. cit.*

Box 1. Indicators on women and armed conflict proposed by the French presidency¹⁰

1. Proportion (number and percentage) of men and women trained specifically in gender equality among diplomatic staff and civilian and military defence staff and staff participating in UN peacekeeping operations and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions;
2. Proportion (number and percentage) of women and men among heads of diplomatic missions and European Commission (EC) delegations and staff participating in UN peacekeeping operations and ESDP missions;
3. Funding (as a total amount and as a percentage of cooperation programmes) allocated by the Member States and the European Commission, in countries affected by armed conflict or in post-conflict situations, to support gender equality, broken down, where possible, to reflect funding to support female victims of violence and the participation of women in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction:
Indicator 3a: Proportion of funding for these programmes allocated to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working for gender equality and women's empowerment; and
4. Proportion (number and percentage) and country of origin of female and male asylum seekers who have obtained the status of refugee, or benefit from subsidiary protection.

While useful, the four indicators outlined above are focused on quantitative measurement, and so may not be suited to capturing qualitative changes such as the influence women have over decision-making within UN peacekeeping operations or European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions. The third indicator mentioned is also particularly vague, and does not provide any information about the types of projects that could be considered to support women's participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This would be necessary before for any indicator designed to measure financial allocations in support of the implementation of the CA and other associated commitments. In particular, there is a need for the EU to specify what types of actions will be taken across the different sectors (governance, economic security, humanitarian aid, etc.) so that SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound) indicators can be developed.¹¹ However, importantly the report does emphasise that the indicators are only a minimum base, and require further elaboration through an inter-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach involving actors and stakeholders at different levels. It is this next step that will be critical in ensuring that implementation can be measured.

Following the build-up in momentum in the EU's efforts to better integrate SCR 1325 (and from June, SCR 1820) in its programmes and policies throughout the year and in parallel to the initiatives of the French Presidency mentioned above, the Council ultimately adopted the CA on 8th December 2008.¹² This document outlines some common definitions and principles based on international and EU-specific lessons learned in relation to gender and peacebuilding, and promotes greater coherence and impact among the EU's crisis management initiatives and reconstruction and development work in this area. The CA outlines the three-pronged approach that the EU commits to adopting: integrating women, peace and security issues in its policy and political dialogue with partner governments; mainstreaming a gender approach in its policies and activities; and supporting strategic actions targeting the protection and empowerment of women.¹³ The document also highlights actions the EU will take in regard to training, exchange of information, and the issues it will consider in the context of its programmes at the country and regional level, in a variety of thematic areas.

Whilst the adoption of the CA signifies an increased level of commitment and understanding of these issues within the EU, as well as outlining a more coordinated framework for the institutions in terms of SCRs 1325 and 1820, the major limitation is that it lacks any clear and specific articulation of how the EU institutions are going to integrate gender issues into the various peacebuilding activities under each sector. For example, whilst the CA states that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes will incorporate the specific needs of women and girls as well as men and boys, there is no information about how this will be done or the role of the EC in doing so. More details about specific activities such as training of officials responsible

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Although the SMART framework is often used when talking about objectives and indicators, it is important to recognise that some of these qualities, in particular 'measurable', can be limiting and even problematic. Some changes may be observable rather than measurable, and it is important not to adopt too technical an approach and maintain flexibility when defining and using indicators.

¹² Council of the EU (2008a). Op. cit.

¹³ Ibid. p.11, para.18.

for implementing DDR processes, development of guidelines on gender-sensitive DDR for EC delegations, or funding studies to determine the most economically viable areas of employment for ex-combatant women and men, would enable a clearer assessment of implementation. Furthermore, the CA does not include an in-built monitoring or accountability mechanism, although there is a commitment to monitoring and evaluation integrated into the CA document. It is now necessary to further elaborate on these indicators, using the French Presidency's contribution as a first step, and to establish mechanisms to collect the necessary data, assess and report on progress and ensure accountability across the wide spectrum of issues and sectors involved in the full implementation of SCR 1325 and 1820:

'[...] on the basis of the four indicators elaborated under the French Presidency for the follow-up of the Beijing Platform for Action area of concern "Women and armed conflicts", the 'Women, Peace and Security Task Force' will develop further indicators for progress regarding the protection and empowerment of women in conflict settings and post conflict situations'.¹⁴

It is this next step towards implementation where many national governments and international organisations have fallen short in regard to SCR 1325 and 1820. The EU is an important actor on the ground in conflict-affected contexts through its development and humanitarian assistance programmes, through the role of EU Member States in peacekeeping missions or its own EU-led missions, and through its role in influencing international regional security policies. By ensuring the development of a concrete implementation and monitoring strategy for the CA, the EU could be instrumental in moving forward the practical integration of women, peace and security issues into peacebuilding, particularly in terms of implementation at the regional level. The remainder of this paper will now turn to exploring indicators, monitoring and reporting, and accountability structures in more detail, before leading into some concrete recommendations to the EU.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.19, para.43.

INDICATORS

More research and a coordinated effort are needed to develop sharper indicators for action regarding the protection and empowerment of women in conflict settings. The development of indicators has the added benefit of helping actors, including the EU, coordinate efforts around a common goal and also measure progress. In addition they provide clarity about what should be achieved. Clear, specific and measurable indicators are a key, but often overlooked, aspect of comprehensive strategies for responding to [women, peace and security issues].¹⁵

Indicators are important policy and planning tools, and without them it is difficult to measure change or impact in a meaningful way or to design appropriate peacebuilding interventions. Indicators can appear and be used in many guises: they can be visible or calculable numbers and facts as well as more subjective opinions and perceptions that can only be assessed through qualitative methods. In the case of quantitative indicators, their effectiveness largely depends on the existence of access to reliable statistics and other data at the national and local level, which can be a challenge, as often the tools to collect this information are not available. Qualitative indicators, on the other hand, are often by their nature harder to measure and so can at times be overlooked or perceived as less valid due to their subjective nature.

Indeed, developing and applying indicators to peacebuilding is particularly challenging, given its complex, multi-faceted nature and the fact that all programmes and policies in this field are inherently linked to power relations and social dynamics, which are difficult to measure. In conflict-affected regions, there is the further practical difficulty that the context of weak state institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and ongoing violence can also make it difficult or impossible to collect data through conventional methods. For example, in Sierra Leone the first post-conflict nationwide household survey was carried out in 2003/4, more than 10 years after the previous one. As a result, until the survey was completed, peacebuilding and development projects were being designed on the basis of pre-war data from the late 1980s. There is therefore a need to move beyond traditional approaches to data collection, and specifically take on more bottom-up approaches that provide space for civil society to contribute information and data that link to qualitative rather than quantitative change, and to find creative ways of getting around some of the challenges associated with the lack of existing data.

The need for sex-disaggregated data has been highlighted in various international conventions and declarations, such as the CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action. Gender-sensitive data, statistics and indicators are important tools for ensuring that policies, programmes and projects are not replicating or reinforcing gender inequalities, and ensuring that governments and other authorities are accountable. They can also provide a basis for a deeper understanding of a context and the measures required to bring about positive change. It is important to distinguish gender-sensitive indicators from statistics, which are simply gender-disaggregated. The former enable measurement of change through comparison with a previous state or with a norm/ideal, whereas the latter present facts only.¹⁶ According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP),¹⁷ there are four ways in which indicators can be considered to be gender-sensitive:

- Disaggregated by sex (the value for the indicator is calculated separately for men and women);
- Gender-specific (on policies explicitly targeted at either men or women, e.g. proportion of seats in parliament reserved for women);
- Implicitly gendered (e.g. number of reported rape cases); and
- Chosen specifically by women or by men.

In summary, 'we need to measure and document gender inequality because what gets measured is more likely to get addressed, and "gender" has often been marginalised within mainstream development [and peacebuilding]'.¹⁸

¹⁵ A. Sherriff with K. Barnes (2008). *Op. cit.* p.77.

¹⁶ T. Beck (1999). *Using gender-sensitive indicators: A reference manual for governments and other stakeholders*. London, UK: Commonwealth Secretariat. p.7. Available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BD30AA2D0-B43E-405A-B2F0-BD270BCEfBA3%7D_ugsi_ref.pdf.

¹⁷ See: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre website, at <http://www.undp.org/oslocentre>.

¹⁸ A. Moser (2007). *Gender and indicators - Overview report*. Brighton, UK: BRIDGE, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. p.7. Available at <http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/IndicatorsORfinal.pdf>.

Box 2. Examples of existing models of gender indicators

- *Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)*: The GDI is a complement to the Human Development Index (HDI) that is designed to correct and adjust the HDI to incorporate gender inequalities. The GEM further assesses female representation in economic and political power, focusing on opportunities rather than capabilities.
- *African Gender Development Index (AGDI)*: This is a composite index introduced by the UN Economic Commission for Africa which incorporates both quantitative and qualitative measures and can be used as a strategic tool for community-level participation, as well as raising political awareness around gender issues.
- *OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data Base (GID-DB)*: This database compiles 60 indicators on gender discrimination that enable analysis of obstacles to women's economic status, and assess a range of variables from social norms to questions of property ownership.
- *Millennium Development Goal 3 (MDG 3)*: The target of MDG 3 is to eliminate gender disparity in the world's primary and secondary education system by 2015. The indicators identified to measure this are: ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education; share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector; proportion of seats held by women in national parliament.

Whilst there has been a significant body of work around the development of gender indicators as applied to development, there has been relatively little attention paid to the elaboration of indicators to capture the range of issues and objectives within SCR 1325 or 1820. This is partly due to the fact that these resolutions are very broad and offer little specific guidance on the types of action that should, or could, be taken by the different stakeholders. However, without indicators linked to specific actions, it is difficult to see how the provisions incorporated within these resolutions could be put into practice. There have been some important recent steps, such as a meeting held in Liberia in February 2009 organised by the Ministry of Gender, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UN Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI) to prioritise indicators developed for the recently launched Liberian National Action Plan (see box 3). However, as yet there is no coordinated action being taken across the different UN agencies, governments, regional bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working on this issue.

An example that illustrates some of the challenges associated with indicators, in particular in choosing between quantitative or qualitative ones, is the issue of how to measure the change in the role of women in politics. SCR 1325 calls for increased representation and participation of women in decision-making structures, and the EU has also committed itself to supporting women's participation in peace processes and women as candidates and voters at all levels of government bodies.¹⁹ One indicator that is often used to measure representation is the number of women, or percentage change thereof, in decision-making structures at the national level. Rwanda, where women number 56 percent of parliamentarians, is now the country with the highest proportion of women in parliament.²⁰ This significant and rapid increase in women parliamentarians is largely the result of a 30 percent quota for women instituted in the new constitution drafted in 2003 following the cessation of 14 years of civil war.

Quotas can play a key role in breaking down the barriers to political representation that women face in many countries around the world, and are therefore a valuable tool. They are also appealing in that they result in an objective, measurable change, i.e. the percentage change in the number of women, which makes the impact – at least in terms of numbers – visible. However, their impact on changing the actual situation of women is not as clear. A concern that is frequently raised is the extent to which female parliamentarians are representative of women in general and whether or not they actually do promote gender issues. Women's roles are often in the lower ranks of party hierarchies and they may not have the authority, capacity or skills to influence decision-making in a meaningful way.²¹ In short, numbers do not equal influence and there is the risk that a quantitative indicator such

19 Council of the EU (2008a). p.18, para.36.

20 'Women run the show in a recovering Rwanda', *Washington Post*, 27th October 2008. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/26/AR2008102602197.html?sid=ST2008051504314>.

21 M. Lytikäinen (2008). *Building Inclusive Post-Conflict Governance: How the EU Can Support Women's Political Participation*. Gender Cluster, Initiative for Peacebuilding. p.21-22. Available at http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Building_Inclusive_Post_Conflict_Governance.pdf.

as the proportion of women in parliament, often used to demonstrate the impact of quotas, can actually mask ongoing discrimination and marginalisation. Furthermore, whilst women may now make up 56 percent of the parliament in Rwanda, the real test will be in five or 10 years time to see if they are still retaining those seats and if the quota has resulted in real change in the perceptions and reality of the role they play in politics.

In Burundi, although there is now a quota of 30 percent women in government at the national level, this has not necessarily resulted in real change in the level of engagement, participation and ability of women to influence decision-making. At a cross-regional workshop held in Brussels in February 2009 with civil society participants from eight different countries and regions, the Burundian participants were advocating for an extension of the quota to the local level. In subsequent discussions, the importance of critically assessing the change that is being sought (i.e. increasing the ability of women to influence decision-making), and not merely looking at the percentage of women in these structures, was highlighted.

If in fact changing the discriminatory attitudes of male political and community leaders is necessary before women obtain more of a voice in decision-making structures, then it could be that a quantitative indicator measuring how many of these individuals have been reached through sensitisation campaigns and a qualitative assessment of the impact may be a more appropriate indicator. This would then also have implications for the type of programme intervention or advocacy campaign being conducted in relation to women's participation in decision-making.

The case of quotas discussed above highlights some of the challenges in measuring normative values and social change, which cannot be easily captured through quantitative indicators. There are another two challenges that are particularly relevant to developing indicators for either the CA or SCR 1325:

- Gender mainstreaming is a process, and it can be challenging to capture incremental changes through indicators associated with specific interventions; and
- Indicators alone do not necessarily provide insight into why gender relations or gender inequalities exist or how they change, and therefore a deeper gender analysis on the basis of the information gathered is also important.²²

Box 3. Developing indicators for the Liberia National Action Plan

The Liberian government launched its National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security²³ (LNAP) in March 2009. This plan was the culmination of a lengthy process of engagement and consultation with various stakeholders from throughout the country, a process that was notable for its participatory nature, as well as Liberia being one of the first conflict-affected countries to adopt such a plan. Discussions around the development of the LNAP began in 2007, initiated by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Gender Ministry along with International Alert and the Liberian Women's Initiative. Following these initial discussions, the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) financed the hiring of a consultant to be based with the Ministry to lead on drafting the plan. Alert and its partners held a series of local-level dialogues around the country during 2008, enabling women living in rural areas to identify their priorities, which were fed into the drafting of the LNAP. The 1325 National Steering Committee also led a process of validation of the plan to ensure that it incorporated a broad range of needs and priorities, as well as aligning closely with the Poverty Reduction Strategy and other existing policy frameworks in Liberia.

The plan itself has four key pillars (protection, prevention, participation and promotion) and incorporates both SCR 1325 and 1820, with a strong focus on addressing and responding to gender-based violence (GBV). Following completion of the plan, over 190 indicators were identified to assess implementation, ranging across the spectrum of quantitative and qualitative approaches to measurement. Many of these indicators

²² T. Beck (1999). Op. cit. p.9.

²³ Government of Liberia (2009). *The Liberia National Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Resolution 1325*. Monrovia, Liberia. Available at http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/lnap_gender.pdf.

are quite ambitious and a high level of investment of resources and analysis will be required to measure progress in implementation against them. In response to this, the Ministry of Gender, UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and UN Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI) identified the need for a more targeted set of 8-10 high priority indicators that would be modest and focus on feasible, accessible and already available data where possible.²⁴ Participants in the indicators workshop included representatives from government ministries and agencies and the UN, CSOs and academics. According to the background paper presented at the workshop, 'The indicators in the LNAP should reinforce overall gender equality programmes and policies [...] Without specific monitoring mechanisms, the LNAP would lose its effectiveness in ensuring that necessary processes and action can be carried out. The mechanisms will also have to be supported by necessary budgetary allocations'.²⁵ Indeed, now that Liberia has a participatory, measurable National Action Plan (NAP), the challenge is to ensure that the resources and capacity are in place for its implementation. There is a provision for an interim and final progress report during the period of implementation (2009–2013) within the NAP, as well as the establishment of a Civil Society Monitoring Observatory (CSMO), which will act as a watchdog and produce a shadow monitoring report by 2013.²⁶ It will be critical to ensure that the representatives sitting on the CSMO receive any necessary capacity-building and training to strengthen their skills in monitoring and evaluation, as well as using indicators.

24 UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). *Workshop on Indicators of Peace Consolidation from a Gender Perspective: the case of Liberia, Including SCR 1325 and SCR 1820: Notes on Aim, Expectations and Workshop Dynamic, February 19-20, 2009.*

25 Foster, Joanna (2009). *Development of Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the Liberian National Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 and SCR 1820 on Women, Peace and Security.* Background paper commissioned by UNIFEM for the Workshop on Indicators of Peace Consolidation from a Gender Perspective: The Case of Liberia, 19th-20th February 2009.

26 Government of Liberia (2009). *Op. cit.* p.45.

MONITORING

Monitoring can be an effective way to validate the different policies or programmes that have been developed, and to increase accountability for their effective implementation. Monitoring mechanisms should be realistic and achievable, and in particular they should be linked to training and the adequate investment of resources to ensure that the necessary processes and actions that they call for can be carried out. Measuring and assessing change is a political question rather than just a technical exercise, and the complexities involved in defining and isolating impact cannot be under-estimated. Some monitoring tools and methodologies (i.e. a population census) may be more difficult to apply in a conflict or crisis situation, where mobility, expertise and resources may be in short supply. Nevertheless, while it may not always represent a full picture, monitoring implementation can be an effective and critical element of the policy cycle. It is also important to look at how monitoring results has an impact on changes in policy design and/or implementation. If feedback into the policy cycle does not occur, then the effects of monitoring may be limited, although it can still have benefits in terms of raising awareness and identifying priority areas for change or improvements.

There has been very little official monitoring of SCR 1325 by the UN bodies including the Security Council, despite continued calls for the development of a monitoring mechanism by groups such as the New York-based NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.²⁷ Similarly, most of the NAPs that have been developed by UN member states, many of whom are also members of the EU, fail to incorporate any concrete or explicit provisions for monitoring. There are *ad hoc* efforts at monitoring progress in some countries. For example, the UK government has issued one official update to its NAP and the Danish government has recently also updated its plan. However, these are not systematic or institutionalised. The comparative table below outlines the various models for indicators and monitoring of the implementation of SCR 1325 and 1820 in EU countries with NAPs. The gender, peace and security working group of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) monitors the development of NAPs, and provides a web platform for sharing these plans with civil society organisations (CSOs) and other interested parties.²⁸

Denmark (June 2005)	No indicators or monitoring information.
UK (March 2006)	No indicators, no publicly available monitoring or accountability framework. HMG has prepared one update to the National Action Plan.
Sweden (June 2006)³⁰	No indicators, but regular follow-up, mid-term evaluation.
Austria (August 2007)	Specific activities with clear lines of responsibility, baseline status, indicators and timeline. An annual report to be delivered to the Council of Ministers and forwarded to Parliament.

27 K. Lynes and G. Torry (Eds.) (2005). *From local to global: making peace work for women*. Security Council Resolution 1325 – Five years on report. New York, US: The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.

28 For more information on NAPs and to view a comparative table of existing NAPs, see: <http://www.eplo.org>.

29 This information is based only on publicly available and English language information, and so may overlook any internal non-public mechanisms that have been set up.

30 Sweden has, like Denmark, recently updated its plan, but there is no English version currently available and so this table is based on the older version.

The Netherlands (December 2007)	List of activities and responsible actors is included.
Spain (early 2008)	No indicators. An annual report to be submitted by the inter-ministerial group.
Finland (September 2008)	Clear objectives along with indicators and lines of responsibility.
Belgium (February 2009)	General activities listed but no specific indicators. Annual evaluations by relevant government departments resulting in recommendations. Evaluation by civil society in 2010 to input into development of Belgian EU presidential priorities (July-Dec 2010).

The capacity of different actors to monitor should also be considered, as specific skill sets are required and those in charge of programme implementation and CSOs advocating on SCR 1325 may not necessarily have experience in monitoring tools. To effectively monitor implementation of gender-specific policies or peacebuilding policies more broadly from a gender perspective, then gender analysis skills are also required. Ideally, monitoring structures should be participatory and include both government-led as well as bottom-up or “shadow” (i.e. non-official) monitoring processes driven by civil society, and the evaluation process established in the Belgian NAP could be a good model for this.

In the Netherlands, a coalition of Dutch CSOs called Working Group on 1325 (WG 1325) has evaluated the first year of implementation of the NAP on 1325. They monitored implementation in three countries (Afghanistan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC) and focused on the specific issues of peacekeeping missions, security sector reform (SSR) and development cooperation.³¹ The Dutch NAP is unique in that it is jointly signed by the government and CSOs, and was also the culmination of a process of collaboration between the different stakeholders. The shadow report, commissioned by the WG 1325 but carried out by external consultants, makes recommendations to both the Dutch government and the CSOs represented in the WG 1325, who were also involved in the initial drafting of the plan. In line with the recommendations in this paper, the Dutch shadow report also recommends that the government develop concrete indicators for its NAP. Some examples of possible indicators outlined in the shadow report include: the annual amount of direct funding to local NGOs for 1325 projects; the percentage of peace mission staff who have received gender sensitivity training and/or have coordinated at least one gender-focused project within the last five years; and the level of yearly communication between the Dutch government and local actors (government/civil society) on 1325-related issues.³²

In the UK, Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS) is a network of thirteen organisations and experts working on gender and peacebuilding and SCR 1325. GAPS is currently completing a pilot study, the Global Monitoring Checklist (GMC), which is expected to be launched in May 2009, and which will assess the implementation of SCR 1325 across five regions (Afghanistan, DRC, Nepal, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka).³³ The GMC uses both quantitative and qualitative data and indicators that GAPS has developed on the basis of the areas mentioned in the UK NAP and SCR 1325. Some examples of the indicators included in the GMC are: inclusion of CSOs within peace negotiations as observers and as participants; the number and percentage of women in decision-making positions (parliamentarians, ministerial and sub-ministerial positions) in local and national government, and whether or not a quota system is in place; and the number and percentage of women represented in the police, army and other security sector institutions. One of the major challenges in compiling the facts and analysis for the GMC has been the lack of reliable information available on women, peace and security issues, both in terms of what the UK government is doing as well as gender-disaggregated data and information about the in-country peacebuilding processes.

These shadow reporting processes point to the difficulty in assessing and monitoring implementation of NAPs and other SCR 1325-related commitments given the paucity of information available, and the failure to

31 H. Majoor and M. Brown (2008). *1 year NAP 1325. Evaluating the Dutch National Action Plan on UNSC Resolution 1325 after one year of implementation*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Working Group 1325. Available at http://www.ifor.org/WPP/Newsitems/Final_Report_Eval_NAP_1325_12Dec2008.pdf.

32 This is just a sample of the indicators suggested in the Dutch report. For the full list, see: *Ibid*.

33 The GMC has yet to be completed. For more information, see: GAPS website, <http://www.gaps-uk.org>; or contact Charlotte Onslow, coordinator@gaps-uk.org.

systematise it in a way that is accessible to those outside of the government departments directly responsible for peacebuilding programming. As illustrated by the above examples, most of the *ad hoc* monitoring of the implementation of SCR 1325 to date has been done by CSOs such as PeaceWomen, which regularly monitors the content of Security Council resolutions.³⁴ These organisations represent a valuable source of expertise to governments, the EU and other actors, and their monitoring efforts should be supported with funding, provision of access to the necessary information and capacity-building where necessary.

Box 4. Monitoring the gender-related impact of the UN Peacebuilding Fund's projects in Burundi

To support the consolidation of peace in Burundi, the UN selected the country as one of the first to receive the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) strategic assistance. International Alert's partner organisation in Burundi, *Dushirehamwe* (Let's Reconcile), in collaboration with the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), has mobilised Burundian civil society organisations (CSOs) to form a body of organisations that are working to promote SCR 1325 in the context of the PBC's engagement in the country: the *Cadre de Coordination et Concertation pour la consolidation de la Paix et la mise en oeuvre de la Resolution 1325* (hereinafter, the Cadre). As a member of the joint Steering Committee of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in Burundi, *Dushirehamwe* has played a role in reviewing projects and documents to ensure the integration of a gender perspective.³⁵ The Cadre brings together a wide range of NGOs, providing expertise across a broad range of areas, and provides a useful platform to coordinate input and activities related to the PBF.

In September and October 2007 *Dushirehamwe* and its partners held two large regional consultations to explain the content of SCR 1325 and the work of the PBC to representatives of women's associations and community leaders. At these consultations, women were delegated to take part in the monitoring of the gender component in the PBF-funded projects being implemented in their communities. These local monitoring groups are an innovative response to the need to monitor the implementation and impact of PBF-funded projects on gender roles and relations within communities outside of Bujumbura. Following these consultations, there were periodic follow-up meetings with the local monitoring groups to share information on the progress of the PBC and the PBF projects, as well as to share information about the work of the Cadre in Bujumbura on the development of gender indicators for the projects. The local monitoring committees are a vital link between those administering the PBF projects in UN and government headquarters and the local communities who stand to benefit from their implementation. In addition to measuring impact and collecting gender-sensitive information and indicators, the local committees also play an important role in raising awareness of those outside of Bujumbura, particularly women and marginalised groups, about the objectives and activities of the PBC and PBF. However, one of the limitations of these local monitoring committees is the lack of experience in both monitoring and gender analysis skills, making capacity-building a necessary component of this work.

³⁴ For more information, see: <http://www.peacewomen.org>.

³⁵ The PBF allocated \$35 million to peacebuilding projects in Burundi, \$3 million of which was for a targeted project on empowering women and promoting gender equality.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING MECHANISMS

In addition to the need for monitoring implementation, and in particular the development of indicators, it is important to remember that it is not just about measuring progress or collecting information. It is also critical to ensure that any data gathered and findings or lessons learned during the monitoring process feed back into the policy cycle and result in positive change. There are therefore important institutional mechanisms that also need to be in place to ensure that monitoring efforts are regularly reported on, and that the evidence gathered is analysed and evaluated, and that accountability structures are in place to ensure that commitments are adhered to.

The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) study on women and armed conflict commissioned by the Slovenian Presidency in 2008 highlighted weak accountability, monitoring and reporting mechanisms as one of the main structural obstacles to progress in implementation of the resolution. According to this research, current EU reporting mechanisms such as the EU Human Rights Annual Report, the EU Presidency Report on ESDP, and EU Presidency Report on the EU Programme of Action on the Prevention of Violent Conflict, do not include a requirement to mention progress related to SCR 1325 or women and armed conflict issues, and as a result it is often completely left out.³⁶ Furthermore, the EC's country strategy papers (CSPs) for conflict-affected countries also fail to integrate gender issues, particularly in the context of programming choices.³⁷ Reporting on SCR 1325 and 1820 should therefore become a systematic feature of the EU's various reporting mechanisms, and the fact that this has now been committed to in the new CA is a sign of positive progress.³⁸

Overall, there has been very little accountability for the implementation of SCR 1325 at the UN or national levels, and this has repeatedly been cited as a major obstacle to progress in integrating gender issues into conflict prevention, peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. Each year at the end of October, the presidency of the UN Security Council has traditionally held a day-long open debate to assess progress in implementing SCR 1325, where the secretary-general's annual report on women, peace and security is discussed. However, an annual one-day event is insufficient to address the accountability gap in relation to the immense and complex commitments that the UN, member states and other actors have undertaken on gender and peacebuilding issues. The tokenistic way in which the UN Security Council addresses these issues is particularly stark when compared with the accountability mechanisms that are in place to support SCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict, another key thematic Security Council resolution.

³⁶ A. Sheriff with K. Barnes (2008). *Op. cit.* p.80-1.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p.38.

³⁸ *Ibid.* para.44.

Table 2. Comparison of accountability mechanisms between UN SCR 1612 and 1325³⁹

Accountability mechanisms	Resolution 1612 (2005): Children and Armed Conflict	Resolution 1325 (2000): Women, Peace and Security
Monitoring and reporting mechanism	System-wide Action Plan to stop recruitment of children and other violations. Contains an agreed monitoring and reporting mechanism.	System-wide Action Plan lacks agreed indicators for effective monitoring. Focuses on UN agency implementation plans, not on violations or on programming results.
“Answerability” mechanism: exposing perpetrators	Secretary-general’s report to the Security Council includes lists of parties in violation of the resolution.	None.
Regular procedures for review	Working Group of the Security Council consisting of all 15 members, and chaired by a permanent member of the Council, meets bi-monthly, reviews the reports of the compliance mechanism, reviews progress in the development and implementation of action plans by parties to armed conflict.	Up to 2008, no formal mechanism beyond one annual Open Debate, an annual report and oral briefings from the UN secretary-general on request of Security Council members, and informal Council meetings on the subject.
Member state accountability	Parties to armed conflict are expected to prepare concrete time-bound action plans to halt the recruitment of children in close collaboration with UN peacekeeping missions and UN Country Teams.	National Action Plans currently exist for 12 countries. These are not a requirement of parties to armed conflict, nor are they reviewed by a Council Working Group or any UN entity.
Focal Point/Leadership within the UN	Special representative of the secretary-general for children and armed conflict.	Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues plays a coordinating role, but without adequate resources or cooperation from an operational counterpart.
Compliance mechanism	UN Country Team or country-level Task Force on Children and Armed Conflict to monitor rates of child soldier recruitment and to press violators to comply with the resolution. Support from UNICEF.	None. Support in some contexts for women’s peace coalitions, women’s access to peace talks, services for survivors, provided by a range of UN entities, not coordinated, no compliance mechanism.

³⁹ Table from A. Goetz (2008). *Progress of the World’s Women 2008/2009 - Who answers to women? Gender and accountability*. New York, US: UNIFEM. p.98.

According to a member state representative who sits on the Security Council, part of the reason why it has proven so difficult to create a monitoring mechanism for SCR 1325 is that the resolution is so broad, whereas in the case of SCR 1612 there are six grave violations that can be more easily monitored and acted upon.⁴⁰ SCR 1820 represents the possibility of progress, given that the secretary-general was requested to include recommendations with regard to protection of civilians from sexual violence in written reports to the Council. Furthermore he will be expected to report by 30th June 2009 on some proposed strategies of how to minimise the incidence of sexual violence in conflict and benchmarks for monitoring progress. This could provide a useful basis for the development of EU-specific indicators with reference to VAW in conflict, which has been highlighted as a particular priority issue at the EU level. However, it must be noted that while VAW is an important element of both SCR 1325 and 1820 and the CA, there is a broader participation and empowerment dimension to integrating gender into peacebuilding. Although these dimensions can be more difficult to measure, they should not be overlooked and the focus on VAW should not be at the expense of other aspects of gender issues.

In the CA, the EU commits to establishing a “Women, Peace and Security Task Force”, which will provide a platform for sharing information and acting as an inter-institutional coordination mechanism involving officials working on gender equality and security issues across the Council and Commission services.⁴¹ This Taskforce, which as of March 2009 had already met once, has the potential to be a useful mechanism for generating shared ownership and leadership within and across the different institutions. It could also provide a regular space for dialogue, collaboration and exchange of good practice across a wide range of stakeholders. It will be important to ensure that the representatives from across the EU institutions selected for the task force are at an appropriate level of seniority, and that its mandate is sufficiently robust to ensure that decisions made by the task force are carried through into implementation by the different bodies responsible for action.

Box 5. October 2010: What will have been achieved by the 10th anniversary of SCR 1325?

As this report has highlighted, monitoring and accountability for implementation of SCR 1325 have been weak throughout the international system and at the national level. As the 10th anniversary of the resolution in October 2010 approaches, increasing attention will likely be placed on the achievements, and shortcomings, in relation to the issues within SCR 1325 and now also SCR 1820. European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner has called on the UN secretary-general to convene a ministerial-level meeting to review implementation of UNSCR 1325 and reinvigorate commitment to tackling outstanding issues. This request has been welcomed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The coming months therefore offer an important opportunity to review progress in implementation across different areas, including at the regional level. On 27th February 2009, the gender cluster of IfP, along with the EU and African Union (AU) delegations to the UN in New York organised a roundtable on ‘Increasing dialogue and collaboration between the UN and regional organisations to enhance the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820’.

In advance of October 2010, renewed commitment and strategic partnerships amongst civil society, government, and regional and international bodies are increasingly important to ensure the mainstreaming of a gender perspective into peace and security processes. While the ministerial review meeting offers an important opportunity for member states to highlight achievements, there is a risk that it will not reflect the reality on the ground for the millions of women and girls and men and boys living in conflict-affected regions. There is therefore an urgent need to ensure that any review processes are consultative and participatory and involve civil society organisations (CSOs) in monitoring and analysis. Furthermore, in light of any new commitments that are made on the 10th anniversary, the need for an adequate monitoring and reporting framework, increased financial resources and the strong backing of UN-, regional- and national-level leadership will be paramount. It is also recommended that the international community, and the EU, use the opportunity of the 10th anniversary to provide momentum to current efforts to establish indicators for measuring the impact of SCR 1325.

⁴⁰ Personal interview, New York, May 2008.

⁴¹ Council of the EU (2008a), p.15.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SUPPORTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

While the EU and its institutions must lead on ensuring effective accountability and monitoring for the implementation of its policy commitments such as the CA, CSOs also have an important role to play in ensuring that the EU is regularly held accountable for this implementation. Indeed, civil society consultation and engagement at local, national and regional levels is highlighted as an important issue within the CA and should be complementary to the internal processes being undertaken by the EU. Some of the key ways in which CSOs support accountability and monitoring processes include:

- **Providing expertise** on the impact of conflict on women and women's role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding to Member State delegations. CSOs are a key source of knowledge on gender issues and complex conflict situations, as well as in the analysis of past resolutions. They can be invited to provide input into the development of policy documents, gender trainings for EU representatives, or to address EU officials in forums such as meetings of the Peace and Security Council.
- **Acting as a conduit of information from the field to policymakers.** Civil society networks such as IfP and EPLO can support grassroots peacebuilders to travel to Brussels to meet with delegations and provide first hand accounts about the experience of women and men in conflict zones. They can also draw on their networks and partners working in conflict-affected regions to ensure that information, lessons learned and examples of good practice are transmitted to policymakers and fed into the EC's programming decisions.
- **Acting as a watchdog.** CSOs can monitor the EU and Member States' work and provide information in an accessible way to a broader constituency of other CSOs and Member States. For example, many networks such as GAPS in the UK and Operation 1325 in Sweden work to ensure that their governments uphold their commitments written in their NAPs on SCR 1325.
- **Facilitating dialogue** by enabling ESDP mission representatives and other EU visiting officials to meet with local women's groups and other marginalised stakeholders in conflict-affected countries to assess their needs and priorities. Through its members and their networks, EPLO can identify key individuals and organisations in-country and can facilitate or support the organisation of meetings with EU officials.
- **Providing gender training** workshops to government officials and representatives from EU institutions, in particular the EC delegations, so they can learn about their mandate to implement SCRs 1325 and 1820 and of potential ways to take women, peace and security issues into account in the work of the EU. With the EC Gender HelpDesk, Alert will be facilitating a thematic workshop on women, peace, security and development in September 2009 targeted at Council and EC representatives from Brussels, the EC delegations and interested EU Member States. Such workshops can provide a useful entry point for introducing EU officials to SCR 1325, the CA and other tools, and can offer practical strategies for applying them to the EU's work in conflict-affected countries.

SUGGESTED INDICATORS FOR THE EU'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

At a roundtable organised by the gender cluster of IfP on 12th February 2009 in Brussels, EU policymakers, UN representatives and CSOs discussed the need for indicators and monitoring mechanisms to be developed alongside the CA. One of the outcomes of this meeting was that, in addition to indicators that measure the extent or impact of implementation, indicators that assess the means or process of implementation would also be useful. Indeed, until more specific areas of action within specific sectors such as DDR and SSR, transitional justice or electoral reform are identified, it will be difficult to develop concrete indicators for implementation. Therefore, in the meantime, process-related indicators could be a useful step forward in the context of the EU. The following are some of the key *means of implementation* that the EU has for turning the policy commitments outlined in the CA into action, and indicators that could potentially be associated with each.⁴²

Table 3. Key means of implementing the commitments in the EU Comprehensive Approach

Means of implementation	What this could look like	Possible indicators
Political dialogue	Through its institutions and Member States, the EU can be a powerful voice in political dialogue on a range of issues. In conflict-affected regions, even where states do not take on women, peace and security issues, the EU could use diplomatic pressure to advocate for the inclusion of these issues in any peacebuilding processes or policies being put in place. The EU has committed itself in this area in the Comprehensive Approach (CA): 'The EU will promote the implementation of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 through its political and human rights dialogues with partner countries, particularly those affected by armed conflict, in post conflict phase or situations of fragility [...] The EU will seek to raise awareness and mobilise decision makers on the issues at stake particularly with regard to the preparation of Beijing + 15 and the 10th anniversary of Resolution 1325 in 2010'. ⁴²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of references to the CA or SCR 1325 in statements by the EU. • Gender-sensitive language visible in political processes in which the EU is engaged (i.e. peace negotiations). • Number of references to the CA or SCR 1325 and 1820 in Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), National Indicative Programmes, or other country-level policies and frameworks.

⁴² Ibid. p.13, para.23-4.

Financial resources	<p>The EC has a diverse range of funding instruments at its disposal, all of which could be mobilised in support of women, peace and security issues. Specifically, 'EU financial instruments with a conflict prevention, crisis management or post-conflict component will incorporate a gender dimension in their programming and implementation'. An example of how this is already being done is through the gender cluster of the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP), where the Instrument for Stability (IfS) is supporting a range of field-level activities and research designed to improve responses to gender and peacebuilding on the ground.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total amount and percentage of funds per funding instrument allocated to 1325-related issues. • Total amount and percentage of funds allocated to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working with SCR 1325 in conflict-affected regions. • Improvement in EU systems for tracking of financial resources.
Regional-level coordination	<p>The EU can coordinate its Member States at the regional level. It can also act as a body in its own right and coordinate with other regional bodies, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the African Union (AU). In February 2009, in collaboration with IfP and the AU delegation to the UN, the EU representation at the UN in New York organised a roundtable to discuss the different aspects of regional-level implementation of SCR 1325 and 1820 and what could be learned from the UN experience. As outlined in the CA, 'EU actors will work together with relevant intergovernmental organisations, particularly the UN but also actors such as the OSCE and AU and other regional organisations willing to advance gender equality and peace and build on existing initiatives and experience. The goal is to create synergies in situations where the EU and UN or other intergovernmental organisations play significant roles'.⁴³</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of joint activities related to SCR 1325 organised by the EU in collaboration with other regional bodies. • References to the CA, SCR 1325 and 1820 in documents issued as part of the EU-Africa joint strategy. • Support (advice, technical capacity, financial resources, etc.) provided to other regional organisations to assist in developing their own Action Plans on SCR 1325.
Partnerships and engagement with NGOs	<p>Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are a critical source of expertise and context-specific knowledge on SCR 1325 and 1820, and can be valuable partners for implementation of projects linked to these resolutions. The EU has collaborated with a diverse range of NGOs in Brussels on SCR 1325 (principally through the gender, peace and security working group of European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, or EPLO), but there has been less success in collaborating with and supporting NGOs at the delegation level. NGOs often have access to communities where it is hard for the international community to reach, and can therefore act as important links for project implementation, identification of priority issues, and raising awareness of commitments like SCR 1325. It is also important that the EU enables civil society input into policy decisions, and where possible collaborates with NGOs to ensure a balance of top-down and bottom-up responses to women, peace and security issues.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of meetings held with NGOs by European Commission (EC) delegations in conflict-affected countries. • Number of consultations held with NGOs in Brussels. • More regular and systematic communication with NGOs. • Increase in funding allocated to NGOs working on SCR 1325 and 1820. • NGOs invited to participate and present their priorities at EU meetings.

Political leadership	The EU, as a key international actor, has an important role to play in setting the standards for implementation of the provisions within SCR 1325 and 1820; in other words, “walking the walk as well as talking the talk”. For example, SCR 1325 calls for more representation of women at all levels of decision-making, and this includes within the EU. The CA commits the EU to ‘strive towards [a] greater number of women as mediators and chief negotiators’. ⁴⁴ The EU has also committed itself in other policy documents to ensure greater representation and engagement of women in decision-making structures. Nominating and retaining women in leadership positions within the EU institutions would enable the EU to set a positive example for other institutions and governments.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of women appointed as special representatives or to other high-level positions. • Reference to the CA, SCR 1325 and 1820 in mandates of special representatives and any other high-level positions. • Number of women as mediators or chief negotiators.
Exchange of practice among EU Member States	The rotating presidency of the EU could be a useful framework through which to organise lessons learned exchanges between Member States on issues linked to SCR 1325 and 1820. One topic of exchange mentioned in the CA could be sharing experiences with National Action Plans (NAPs) and, in particular, any indicators or monitoring mechanisms that have proven effective.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of meetings between EU Member States to discuss SCR 1325 and 1820. • Lessons learned on NAPs documented and distributed amongst EU Member States and civil society.
Training of EU officials in issues related to women, peace and security	Gender issues and SCR 1325 are now required components of training for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions. Wider knowledge of the CA and commitments within SCR 1325 and 1820, as well as the skills in gender analysis needed to implement these policies, is needed among all EU staff – not just those working on gender issues. Increased efforts should be made to reach out to EC officials working on thematic issues or geographic desks and to involve them in any training or learning opportunities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of EU staff in Brussels and in delegations trained in SCR 1325 and 1820. • Checklists, guidelines, training materials and other tools developed and distributed to EU officials to provide guidance on implementing the CA.

43 Ibid. p.13, para.22.

44 Ibid. p.14, para.25.

CONCLUSION

The adoption of the CA is a significant development with regards to the EU's work on gender and peacebuilding. At the beginning of the IfP project, no such policy framework was in place and efforts to implement SCR 1325 were *ad hoc*, and rested with only a few individuals across the institutions. However, more elaboration of the CA is needed, in particular to turn it into a practical strategy for implementation, and the current momentum generated by developments such as the establishment of the inter-institutional Task Force should be capitalised on. As the EU looks forward to 2010 and the expected high-level ministerial review meeting, the next 18 months offer an excellent opportunity to take on the challenges of implementation and address some of the gaps, particularly those related to monitoring and indicators.

However, the development of monitoring and indicators are only part of the solution, and significant financial investments, training and continued joint action and collaboration between the EU, its Member States, other regional bodies, the UN and civil society will be necessary. It is worth emphasising the need for increased financial resources, as the small amounts available for specific programmes addressing gender and peacebuilding issues do not come close to meeting the many policy commitments that the EU has in this area. This is not, however, a problem unique to the EU. Recent research by UNIFEM demonstrates the fraction of resources that are targeted at gender-specific or gender-related programmes in the context of funds raised through the Consolidated Appeals Process.⁴⁵ Finally, one of the most important caveats to this briefing is that monitoring and indicators for the CA should not be seen as separate from monitoring and indicators across other areas of EU peacebuilding and development work. The two need to be combined and reinforce each other, and although gender-sensitive indicators and monitoring mechanisms need to be developed and applied to the CA specifically, they should also be integrated more broadly into other thematic or geographic policy priority areas.

⁴⁵ The Consolidated Appeals Process is a tool used by aid organisations to raise funds for humanitarian activities as well as to ensure coordination in planning, implementing and monitoring of activities in emergency or immediately post-conflict contexts. For more information, see: <http://ochaonline.un.org/Coordination/ConsolidatedAppealsProcess/tabid/1100/Default.aspx>.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU

MONITORING

- As committed to in the CA, the EU should ensure that regular updates on the implementation of activities related to SCR 1325 and 1820 are included in the Presidency Reports on the Progress on the Prevention of Violent Conflict and the EU Presidency Reports on ESDP.
- The Task Force should establish clear terms of reference that include responsibility for monitoring the work of the different institutions in relation to the CA. Regular meetings of the taskforce should be organised, and ideally CSOs should be invited periodically to attend these meetings in addition to being regularly updated on the work of the Task Force.
- The EC should develop checklists or guidelines that build on the CA, highlighting key areas of implementation that staff in delegations are required to monitor to ensure that gender is being integrated across the different sectors, and that opportunities are being used to engage with NGOs, especially women's organisations; influence national policy dialogues; and that funding is being targeted at activities in support of SCR 1325 and 1820.
- The EU should carry out an evaluation of the impact of SCR 1325-related activities to date. In addition to a specific evaluation, elements of such an assessment could be integrated into the ongoing gender review of the EC Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid's (ECHO) work or any upcoming assessments of the EU's peacebuilding activities, such as the thematic evaluation of the EC's support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This would enable the EU to assess good and bad practice, establish a baseline, and identify priority areas for action.
- The EU should undertake an audit of EC Programming Finances to assess the amount of financial resources specifically targeted at women-specific projects or with a broader gender equality component. Such a budget review could act as a useful baseline against which to assess future resources allocations, and ensure more gender-responsive budgeting.
- The EU should conduct an assessment of the existing human resource capacity and gender-related expertise within the EC, and for this baseline develop a strategy to meet training and capacity-building needs. A roster could also be developed to facilitate the identification of specific skill sets and ensure that those with more gender expertise can be called on to support colleagues in the development of policies, funding calls, and other project-related activities.

INDICATORS

- As the Task Force and other actors within the EU begin to develop indicators for the CA, efforts should be made to ensure a participatory and inclusive process, including representatives from across the EU institutions as well as EU Member States, CSOs and academic experts where relevant. Involving a wide range of actors representing different perspectives will help to ensure that the indicators are suited for measuring progress towards the defined goals.
- Given the breadth and scope of the CA, a set of minimum priority indicators should be developed, which could be the starting point for monitoring the implementation of the CA. These indicators could be focused on process rather than outcomes, until a more concrete plan of action to accompany the CA has been developed.

- Any indicators that are developed for the CA should also be in line with and complement those attached to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), EU Member State NAPs, and any other relevant international commitments. The indicators should also be integrated into CSPs (new ones or at the mid-point review), National Indicative Programmes, and any other country-level commitments or policy frameworks that the EU adopts.

ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORTING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS

- Effective coordination needs to be at the heart of implementation efforts, as the potential for duplication and unfilled gaps is large given the broad scope of the CA framework and the range of actors that needs to be involved in its implementation. The new Women, Peace and Security Taskforce has the potential to act as this coordination mechanism, and it is therefore important that the representatives from different institutions who sit on this taskforce have the authority to ensure that decisions are followed through on.
- Adequate resources should be allocated at the delegation level, in particular in terms of capacity-building and training of staff members. Simply designating junior officials as “gender focal points” with limited or no specialist knowledge on these issues, nor sufficient seniority to make a real difference, will rarely result in the kind of concrete and effective progress that is necessary.
- The lack of a senior, dedicated staff member in the EC who is able to focus full-time on gender and peacebuilding issues is also an obstacle to progress in implementation. The EC should consider the possibility of creating a senior advisor position within the Commission, or ideally within each Directorate-General, to provide technical expertise and the authority required to push implementation forward.
- Most importantly, the CA should not be seen as a separate, standalone document. The integration of gender and SCRs 1325 and 1820 should be recognised as a cross-sectoral issue, and to actually turn this into practice it is necessary to link these priorities into other areas of EU peacebuilding and development work, both sectorally and thematically, as well as in geographic-specific policies and interventions.
- The EU and its Member States should support the development of NAPs in third countries and other regional bodies. As a first step, EU Member States should come together to share good practices, and develop a plan for coordinated support to the development of similar plans in conflict-affected countries, as well as in EU countries that have yet to create their own. The EU could provide technical capacity and financial resources, as well as applying political and diplomatic pressure to encourage the adoption of plans of action or similar policy frameworks for the implementation of SCR 1325 and 1820.
- Ensuring accountability requires political will and responsibility at the highest levels, and it is important that the EU remains actively committed to these issues. Future Presidencies can play an important role in ensuring that this agenda maintains a high profile in the work of the Council and the Commission.
- The EU should appoint more women to senior-level positions, in line with the recommendations in SCR 1325 and the NAPs of several EU Member States. To date, there has been no female special representative of the EU.
- In partnership with other actors, the EC should also promote consultation mechanisms at the national and local levels to enable women’s groups and other CSOs to input into policy processes both in Brussels and at the delegation level. CSOs often have a deep knowledge of conflict contexts, as well as access to a broader range of stakeholders than those available to the EU in Brussels or its delegations. By collaborating with these organisations and supporting them with funding for activities and capacity-building, the EU can multiply its efforts in relation to the implementation of SCR 1325 and 1820.

COUNTRY REPORTS

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